Parfit On What Matters Ebookers
On What Matters is a major work in moral philosophy. It is the long-awaited follow-up to Derek Parfit's 1984 book Reasons and Persons, one of the landmarks of twentieth-century philosophy. Parfit now presents a powerful new treatment of reasons, rationality, and normativity, and a critical examination of three systematic moral theories - Kant's ethics, contractualism, and On What Matters is a major work in moral philosophy.
It is the long-awaited follow-up to Derek Parfit's 1984 book Reasons and Persons, one of the landmarks of twentieth-century philosophy. Parfit now presents a powerful new treatment of reasons, rationality, and normativity, and a critical examination of three systematic moral theories - Kant's ethics, contractualism, and consequentialism - leading to his own ground-breaking synthetic conclusion. Along the way he discusses a wide range of moral issues, such as the significance of consent, treating people as a means rather than an end, and free will and responsibility. On What Matters is already the most-discussed work in moral philosophy: its publication is likely to establish it as a modern classic which everyone working on moral philosophy will have to read, and which many others will turn to for stimulation and illumination. Who am i kidding?
I didn't read this whole thing but i'm still giving myself credit (in Goodreads terms) for another book read in 2017.I hope to be be able to follow the entirety of this work's ideas, but the references and bibliography convince me the minimum requirements for a 50/50 chance of that are (a) true dedication to the study of moral philosophy, (b) surviving for another 30 years, and (c) retaining full physical and mental function for the duration.A book that attempts to synthesize Who am i kidding? I didn't read this whole thing but i'm still giving myself credit (in Goodreads terms) for another book read in 2017.I hope to be be able to follow the entirety of this work's ideas, but the references and bibliography convince me the minimum requirements for a 50/50 chance of that are (a) true dedication to the study of moral philosophy, (b) surviving for another 30 years, and (c) retaining full physical and mental function for the duration.A book that attempts to synthesize all of moral philosophy under one theory, though, deserves 5 stars. Parfit's reach probably exceeded any mortal's grasp.Dear Professor Parfit,If you're reading this from some supernatural vista but you've ignored American television, allow me to suggest that you watch The Good Place: i think you're the inspiration for the excellent and delightful character Chidi Anagonye.Kudos for your life's work.Rest in well-deserved peace, sir. Since my review is so extensive I have posted here my introduction and conclusion, for the rest of the review, please follow this link:IntroductionThis is a lengthy review for a lengthy book, and much of what is covered in it will not be discussed here. This is not because these themes are unimportant, but because they do not concern me personally. This may seem to be a somewhat self-serving approach, but I think it is significantly justified by the sheer size of the w Since my review is so extensive I have posted here my introduction and conclusion, for the rest of the review, please follow this link:IntroductionThis is a lengthy review for a lengthy book, and much of what is covered in it will not be discussed here.
This is not because these themes are unimportant, but because they do not concern me personally. This may seem to be a somewhat self-serving approach, but I think it is significantly justified by the sheer size of the work and the enormous depth of argument.The topics which I have chosen to exclude are those that are the concern of Parts 2-5, and I will briefly explain why I have omitted their discussion here before I move on. Part 2 concerns Kant's ethics and his contribution to moral philosophy. In it, Parfit criticizes nearly all of Kant's ideas and proposes what he takes to be Kantian solutions to those difficulties. Parfit's hope is that these revisions, by being approached in a Kantian way, would be acceptable to Kant. Whether this is true or not, I cannot say.
I am by no means an expert on Kant or his moral philosophy, and I will leave it to those better informed to properly assess Parfit's ideas.Part 3 concerns Parfit's Triple Theory. Parfit does the same for Contractualism and Consequentialism that he does for Kantianism.
For each normative approach, Parfit criticizes and improves those concepts which he finds particularly problematic. What happens is that each theory (more specifically, Parfit's idea of the best versions of each theory) can accommodate each other theory so that they all converge to a point. This point, Parfit hopes, is the supreme principle of morality, and each theory is just one way of reaching this single point. It is worth noting that Parit does not consider his Triple Theory to be the property which makes acts right or wrong, but that it is the fundamental principle by which we can know what is. Although this is arguably the heart of this two volume behemoth, I have chosen not to say anything more about it. This is partly for the simple fact that I find the idea of a single supreme principle of morality to be unlikely and I am skeptical of Parfit's gerry-meandering approach to it. It is, perhaps, possible to find a principle which accommodates multiple normative theories, but I seriously doubt the significance of such a project.
It seems one could take Parfit's same approach, find different points of contention and different solutions to resolve those difficulties of each theory and consequently wind up with a different principle entirely. If this is possible, as I have little doubt that it is, it may be done multiple times by multiple philosophers resulting in multiple supreme principles which may conflict with each other. Perhaps some further philosopher may come along and decide to do the same for these supreme principles and find some further convergence leading to a supra-supreme principle of morality. And so on, ad infinitum.With this possibility in mind, we have reason to doubt that Parfit has actually uncovered the supreme principle of morality.
We also have reason to doubt such a project will lead us to one. Perhaps we can simply admit that there are irreconcilable disagreements between moral theories. This would not satisfy Parfit for reasons I explain towards the end of this review. We could also concede that there are many independent normative truths and that morality is not as simple as most philosophers hope. Maybe there is some other set of options available. Whatever we choose, it seems clear enough to me that Parfit's approach is less than ideal.Part 4 is a collection of critical essays by various philosophers and Part 5 consists in Parfit's responses.
These are all quite interesting in their own right. I do not cover these because I see this review as something of an extension of this.This leaves Part 1 and 6. I have chosen to discuss Part 1 because it is (1) the bedrock of Parfit's theory and (2) because I agree with a great deal of it. I think Parfit's Wide Dualist solution to Sidwick's dualism is most likely correct. I agree with Parfit about rightness and wrongness being about expectability. And I think his account of reasons is generally correct.
This first section can stand independently from every other section except for Part 6. Part 6 deals with Parfit's metaethics, and is, to me, the most important aspect of Parfit's work.Despite my exclusion of these areas of On What Matters, it is important to emphasize that they are extremely fascinating and rewarding. Many of Parfit's most interesting discussions are to be found there.
Anyone who decides to skip these sections entirely will be doing themselves a great disservice.ConclusionAs I mentioned previously, there are many instances where Parfit diverts arguments by claiming that certain philosophers lack a concept of normativity in a reason-implying sense. This is significant in many ways. This is evident throughout the work, but made explicit in Parfit's chapter 30, Normative Truths,which is deeply personal. In it, he discusses the idea of disagreement and epistemological peers. Parfit worries that if two reasonable and rational people disagree, it may be possible that one cannot give greater weight to one's own beliefs than to someone who is one's epistemological peer.
These worries are applied to the disagreement Parfit has with other moral philosophers in general and Bernard Williams in particular.Williams is a philosopher whom Parfit deeply admires. He is concerned with their disagreements on fundamental meta-ethical principles, and with good reason.
If Williams is correct, Parfit's own work and concern with ethics are an illusion. Parfit thinks that the questions with which he is dealing do have objective answers. As such, one of them must be either wrong or mistaken. Parfit does not want to simply claim that Williams is wrong, since he believes Williams is a brilliant moral philosopher. Instead, Parfit comes to the conclusion that Williams simply lacks Parfit's notion of irreducibly normative reasons and ultimately conflates psychological reasons with normative reasons because he misunderstands Parfit's views.I am not sure this is true. Williams, rather, seems to suggest that there can be no such thing as what philosophers like Parfit suppose irreducibly normative reasons are and develops his own theory accordingly.Although this is a common line of argument, I think Parfit is partly right.
Many Subjectivists think that for a reason to be a reason it must cause one to act, or have a motivational force. Parfit denies this. Many Subjectivists, like Williams, believe this and this belief may presuppose their overall meta-ethical theories. If it is true that a reason can only be such if it has motivational force, it must be something (at least partly) psychological and internal. If we think this is an essential component of what it is to be a reason, then we really are not talking about the same concept Parfit is discussing.As far as conceptual understanding of the notion of a reason is concerned, these two considerations seem equally valid. We are left with something of a chicken-or-the-egg dilemma.
If the latter comes first, i.e. Our metaphysical naturalism leads us to believe reasons must have motivating force, there really is a conflict between the views of Subjectivists and Parfit.
If the latter is primary, i.e. Motivational force is considered a necessary component of a reason which leads to believing that all that is metaphysically needed are internal reasons, there is no disagreement, but rather a misunderstanding.I'm not sure which is primary, but it is clear that it is the metaphysical presupposition which poses the greatest threat to being a genuine disagreement with Parfit's view. To bypass this, Parfit either needs to provide sufficient justification for denying naturalism, or else accepting it and grounding normativity in it. It is obvious that it is the former approach that Parfit hopes to take.
He has already been convinced through his arguments that Naturalism is not compatible with Normative Realism. This leaves him the one option.I have already, successfully I think, shown that Parfit's arguments against Non-Analytic Naturalism are not decisive. As such, it is open to Parfit, or at least other philosophers to accept an Objectivist Non-Analytic Naturalism. These philosophers will genuinely understand Parfit's views and will genuinely disagree. But they will disagree metaphysically, not normatively. This should ease his mind a little.Parfit, in concluding that most Subjectivists fail to share his concept of a reason, believes that he has been deeply misunderstood.
It is clear that this causes him great distress. What's worse, and not mentioned by Parfit himself, are the consequences of his confessions within this chapter to a Subjectivist if he is in fact correct. Not only would such a reader fail to understand Parfit's notion of a reason, he will also see these confessions as Parfit's own psychological motivations, or reasons, for defending his meta-ethical view. Because Parfit denies that motivational force has anything to do with normative truth, Parfit can admit to his desire for the disagreements between him and other philosophers to be merely apparent. But if he is right, these other philosophers will misunderstand his view and take his confessions to be evidence for their own Subjectivist view.I do not believe that Parfit is altogether correct.
But I also do not think this is nearly as devastating as Parfit himself would think. Although I disagree with Parfit's meta-ethical view, it is only in terms of metaphysics. Parfit's failure to argue against Non-Analytic Naturalism should be considered a good thing. At least this way, it leaves open the possibility of an Objective Naturalist view to be accepted as well as Parfit's own.There is much more to be said for and against this work. Some sections are so thick in concepts and arguments, it seems almost impossible to get through. Others are more light and entertaining as, for example, the wonderful chapter at the end of the second volume on Nietzsche’s ethics. His Appendices are also extremely rewarding and engrossing, particularly the more metaphysical ones like D: Why Anything?
Parfit On What Matters Ebookers Lyrics
There is, of course, a lot of material covered here. No single review can do justice to the philosophical treasures within these two volumes. This was clearly a labor of love on Parfit’s part and is equally deserving of laborious attention from anyone concerned with ethics. Amazingly, Parfit is able to compile this behemothian text with humor, countless thought experiments, and philosophical riddles to occupy philosophers (professional and amateur alike) for decades, perhaps even centuries, to come. Derek Parfit is without doubt one of those thinkers who returned my interest in philosophy. His seminal work 'Reasons and Persons' is one of my favorite books of all time. If you haven't read Parfit, read that book.
It's unbelievable!' On What Matters' is a much longer read.
Some of it may be uninteresting to those of you who are not into philosophy. Some parts can, in fact, be skipped as Parfit himself noted.
But if you enjoy his style, it's hard to put that book down.There are many reviews of Derek Parfit is without doubt one of those thinkers who returned my interest in philosophy. His seminal work 'Reasons and Persons' is one of my favorite books of all time.
If you haven't read Parfit, read that book. It's unbelievable!' On What Matters' is a much longer read. Some of it may be uninteresting to those of you who are not into philosophy.
Some parts can, in fact, be skipped as Parfit himself noted. But if you enjoy his style, it's hard to put that book down.There are many reviews of this book out there. One of the best is probably by Peter Singer. So let me point out what I found especially fascinating, given my long-lasting interest in the philosophy of pessimism. I read a lot of books arguing for it, but I found very few good non-religious rebuttals.In Volume 2, Parfit offers the strongest rebuttal of the philosophy of pessimism and anti-natalism I've seen.
On What Matters is a major work in moral philosophy. It is the long-awaited follow-up to Derek Parfit's 1984 book Reasons and Persons, one of the landmarks of twentieth-century philosophy. Parfit now presents a powerful new treatment of reasons, rationality, and normativity, and a critical examination of three systematic moral theories - Kant's ethics, contractualism, and consequentialism - leading to his own ground-breaking synthetic conclusion. Along the way he discusses a wide range of moral issues, such as the significance of consent, treating people as a means rather than an end, and free will and responsibility. On What Matters is already the most-discussed work in moral philosophy: its publication is likely to establish it as a modern classic which everyone working on moral philosophy will have to read, and which many others will turn to for stimulation and illumination.'
Synopsis' may belong to another edition of this title. About the Author:Derek Parfit is one of the leading philosophers of our time. He is a Senior Research Fellow at All Souls College, Oxford, Global Distinguished Professor of Philosophy at New York University, and a Fellow of the British Academy and of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. He is the author of Reasons and Persons (OUP, 1984), one of the most influential books in philosophy of the last several decades.Review:'It is finally here. There is no doubt that On What Matters is an epochal work.
A remarkable achievement, giving us a truly comprehensive picture of the moral outlook. Of one of the greatest moral thinkers of our time. Parfit's intellectual personality radiates throughout On What Matters, which as a whole presents a gripping and illuminating picture of a single, comprehensive view of the projects of both normative and metaethical inquiry.' -Mark Schroeder, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews' On What Matters stands as a grand and dedicated attempt to elaborate a fundamentally misguided perspective. Its diligence and its honesty command respect. Perhaps these real virtues will set standards for a very different ventures in academic ethics. Naturalist or otherwise-for a return to the tradition of attempts to understand and improve everyday judgment, and to provide resources for people and policymakers everywhere.
In the end, that is what matters.' -Philip Kitcher, The New Republic'the most significant work in ethics since Sidgwick's masterpiece was published in 1873. A work of epic proportions and ambitions.' -Peter Singer, Times Literary Supplement'the most eagerly awaited book in philosophy since Ludwig Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations. Should the book become as influential as the stars guiding its arrival suggest, it could seriously alter the way that ethics is thought about and taught.' -Constantine Sandis, Times Higher Education'represents many years of work by one of the most influential philosophers of our time.' -Simon Blackburn, Financial Times'an epochal work.
A remarkable achievement, giving us a truly comprehensive picture of the moral outlook - both normative and metaethical - of one of the greatest moral thinkers of our time.' -Mark Schroeder, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews'Parfits arguments are of extraordinary brilliance and clarity, and by any standards On What Matters is an immensely powerful achievement. Parfits intricate and beautifully lucid book is undoubtedly the work of a philosophical genius.' -John Cottingham, The Tablet'This book presents a comprehensive theory of the metaphysics, epistemology, and substance of ethical thought. It originality is often striking and its arguments profound.
On What Matters is a monument that will shape the field for many years.' -Kieran Setiya, Mind'On What Matters, not only gets the reader thinking, but leaves him or her with a lot of subsequent questions to consider from the perspective of both normative - how things should or ought to be - and metaethical - what is good and what is bad - inquiry.' -Joe Sinclair, New Nurturing Potential'About this title' may belong to another edition of this title. Book Description Oxford University Press, United Kingdom, 2011. Condition: New. Language: English. Brand new Book.
On What Matters is a major work in moral philosophy. It is the long-awaited follow-up to Derek Parfit's 1984 book Reasons and Persons, one of the landmarks of twentieth-century philosophy. Parfit now presents a powerful new treatment of reasons, rationality, and normativity, and a critical examination of three systematic moral theories - Kant's ethics, contractualism, and consequentialism - leading to his own ground-breaking synthetic conclusion.Along the way he discusses a wide range of moral issues, such as the significance of consent, treating people as a means rather than an end, and free will and responsibility. On What Matters is already the most-discussed work in moral philosophy: its publication is likely to establish it as a modern classic whicheveryone working on moral philosophy will have to read, and which many others will turn to for stimulation and illumination. Seller Inventory # AAZ923. Book Description Oxford University Press, United Kingdom, 2011. Condition: New.
Language: English. Brand new Book. On What Matters is a major work in moral philosophy. It is the long-awaited follow-up to Derek Parfit's 1984 book Reasons and Persons, one of the landmarks of twentieth-century philosophy. Parfit now presents a powerful new treatment of reasons, rationality, and normativity, and a critical examination of three systematic moral theories - Kant's ethics, contractualism, and consequentialism - leading to his own ground-breaking synthetic conclusion.Along the way he discusses a wide range of moral issues, such as the significance of consent, treating people as a means rather than an end, and free will and responsibility.
On What Matters is already the most-discussed work in moral philosophy: its publication is likely to establish it as a modern classic whicheveryone working on moral philosophy will have to read, and which many others will turn to for stimulation and illumination. Seller Inventory # AAZ923.